In the classical secret-key generation model, common randomness is generated by two terminals based on the observation of correlated components of a common source, while keeping it secret from a non-legitimate observer. It is assumed that the statistics of the source are known to all participants. In this paper, the secret-key generation based on a compound source is studied where the realization of the source statistic is unknown. The protocol should guarantee the security and reliability of the generated secret-key, simultaneously for all possible realizations of the compound source. A single-letter lower-bound of the secret-key capacity for a finite compound source is derived as a function of the public communication rate constraint. A multi-letter capacity formula is further computed for a finite compound source for the case in which the public communication is unconstrained. Finally, a single-letter capacity formula is derived for a degraded compound source with an arbitrary (possibly infinite) set of source states and a finite set of marginal states.
I. INTRODUCTION
C URRENT cryptographic approaches are dependent on the computational capabilities of the non-legitimate terminals. By increasing technological advances, the security of transmitted information can not be guaranteed for sure. In contrast, an information theoretic approach provides us with a framework for future coding schemes that guarantee security independent of computational capabilities of the eavesdroppers.
The next generation of wireless communication systems should support applications with very low communication latency, availability, high reliability and security. Tactile internet is an example of such systems which has many applications in industry, robotics, virtual and augmented reality, and health care. To address the security aspects of such systems, a Manuscript low latency security protocol is required. The classical encryption algorithms can only be implemented in the higher protocol layers of the communication systems, causing extra delays. In contrast, information theoretic security works directly in the physical layer and does not generate much latency. This leads to an absolute security in the sense of secure communication and authentication of participants with very low latency. To achieve this kind of security, new system infrastructures should be implemented to satisfy the mentioned requirements [1] - [3] . The information theoretic security is currently developing very fast such that leading network operators and institutes for secure public communication have made this field as their central research area [4] , [5] . The information theoretic source model which is investigated in this work addresses both Secret-Key (SK) generation and authentication in such systems.
Information theoretic security was first introduced by Shannon in [6] . In the so called one-time pad method, each transmitting message is encrypted by a SK. If there is no SK available, it has to be generated first. One approach is to generate a shared SK based on a common source. In this model, two terminals observe correlated components of a common source and communicate over a public noiseless channel to generate a common SK. Afterwards, they can encrypt subsequent communication using this SK. This procedure relies on the generation of Common Randomness (CR) which was introduced in [7] and later used by Maurer in [8] and Ahlswede and Csiszár in [9] to determine the SK capacity. The SK sharing is further studied in [10] - [15] .
However, in all these models which were used for SK generation, perfect knowledge of the source statistics was assumed. In a more general approach, the source uncertainty should be taken into account where the terminals do not have the knowledge of the actual realization of the source. An achievable SK rate for a compound Discrete Memoryless Multiple Source (DMMS) {(X, Y s , Z s )} s∈S was given in [16] . In [17] , the compound DMMS {(X s , Y s )} s∈S was studied and the SK capacity was computed. As related problems, compound source coding, SK generation with Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVCs), compound wiretap channels, and robust biometric authentication were studied in [18] - [24] .
In this work, a SK generation model for a compound DMMS with one-way communication in presence of an eavesdropper is studied. The terminals observe a compound source S := {XY Z, s} s∈S := {(X s , Y s , Z s )} s∈S , and two of them generate a shared SK by using only a one-way communication over a public noiseless channel while keeping it secret from the third terminal (eavesdropper). As the source realization index s ∈ S is unknown to the terminals, an estimation method such as hypothesis testing is incorporated to find the marginal source index of the transmitter. This approach is used to generalize the result in [10, Th. 2.6] , [12, Th. 17.21] to the compound setup for the source S.
In Section II, the model for SK generation is presented. Section III gives the main results. A single-letter lower-bound for the SK capacity of a finite compound source is derived as a function of the communication rate constraint over the public channel. A multi-letter SK capacity formula is computed as well for the case where the public communication rate is unconstrained. We proposed these two results which are stated in Theorems 1 and 2, originally in [25] in which the proof ideas have been outlined. In the present paper, in contrast, we give the complete proofs of both theorems as well as the proofs for random coding and security lemmas. The third and main result of this work which is not available in [25] gives a single-letter SK capacity formula for a degraded compound source, where the set of source states may be infinite and the set of marginal states is finite. Compared with previous theorems, this result which is stated in Theorem 3 is more practical in the sense that the SK capacity is single-letter and also valid for sources with an infinite set of source states S. The complete formal proofs are given in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and Section VI discusses the open problems.
Notation: R and N denote the set of real numbers and natural numbers respectively. The complement of a set A is denoted by A c and the subtraction of two sets A and B is given by A − B := A ∩ B c . The underlying probability measure is represented by Pr. The log(·) and exp(·) are to the basis 2 and ln(·) is the natural logarithm to the basis e. For any function f , the cardinal number of the range of the function is denoted by f . Random Variables (RVs) are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X n , U, . . .), their realizations by small letters (e.g. x n , u, . . .), their ranges (alphabets) by script letters (e.g. X n , U, . . .), and their Probability Distributions (PDs) by Roman letters (e.g. P X n , P U , . . .). All alphabets corresponding to RVs are supposed to be finite. H (X) and I (X; Y ) represent the entropy of a RV X and the mutual information between X and Y respectively. h(a) with a ∈ [0, 1] is the binary entropy function and is given by h(a) := −a log a − (1 − a) log(1 − a). For any two probability measures P and Q, P − Q := x∈X |P(x) − Q(x)| denotes their 1-norm distance. 1 A (·) denotes the indicator function for a set A. E U [X] represents the expectation of a RV X with respect to the RV U . A stochastic matrix W : X → P(Y) is a function from the set X to P(Y), where P(Y) is the set of all PDs defined on the set Y. Finally, X − Y − Z denotes a Markov chain for RVs X, Y , and Z . Figure 1 shows the SK generation model which is used throughout this work. Transmitter (Alice), receiver (Bob) Fig. 1 . SK generation protocol for compound DMMS model. and eavesdropper (Eve) observe a compound DMMS S = {XY Z, s} s∈S for time duration n ∈ N. Alice and Bob have the goal to generate a shared SK K A = K B . It is assumed that all terminals know the set of source states S as well as its statistics with PDs {P XY Z,s } s∈S . However, they do not have the knowledge of the actual realization s ∈ S of the source statistic. Therefore, RVs X n s , Y n s and Z n s represent their initial knowledge for the source state s ∈ S. The next definition describes the model which is studied through out this work.
II. SK GENERATION MODEL
Definition 1: The SK generation model consists of a transmitter (Alice), a receiver (Bob), an eavesdropper (Eve), a compound DMMS by which their initial knowledge is given, and a public noiseless communication channel between all terminals. The source is given for an arbitrary set of states S, by a sequence of generic RVs S = {XY Z, s} s∈S taking their values in the finite set X × Y × Z.
As RVs X n s and Y n s are correlated, Alice and Bob may generate some CR by communicating over the public channel. In this work, only a one-way communication over the public channel, initiated by Alice, is allowed. The following definition gives a more precise description of this procedure.
Definition 2: A one-way SK generation protocol for the model in Definition 1 with source S = {XY Z, s} s∈S consists of the following two steps:
• After observing X n s , Alice transmits a message f c (X n s ) to Bob over the public noiseless channel. f c is called public communication function. 1 • Next, Alice generates a SK, represented by a RV K A , based on her knowledge X n s and Bob generates a SK, represented by a RV K B , based on his knowledge (Y n s , f c (X n s )). K A and K B take their values in K. As the communication over the public channel is overheard by Eve, this should not reveal any information about the SK. Moreover, the generated SK should have a uniform distribution. Combining these two criteria together leads to 1 Similarly as in [12, Problem 17.15(a) ], it can be shown that a randomized f c in the one-way SK generation protocol does not increase the SK capacity. Therefore, the communication function f c is assumed to be a deterministic function of X n s and no randomization is considered here. a compact notion, called security index, which was first introduced in [11] . Definition 3: For RVs K A and V , taking values in the sets K and V respectively, the security index is given by
In our context, K A represents the SK and V Eve's knowledge. This short notion is a powerful tool which can be used to describe both strong secrecy [26] and the uniformity of the generated SK. The next definition, uses this concept to define an achievable SK rate and capacity of a compound source. 
The SK capacity C sk (S, ) is defined to be the supremum of all achievable SK rates. If there is no communication rate constraint, i.e. = ∞, then condition (1) in the definition is inactive and the capacity is denoted by C sk (S).
Similarly as in [10] and [12] , the communication rate constraint is also part of the achievability definition. This is because, in a realistic model where the communication cost is an important parameter, the information exchange rate between the terminals is restricted.
In the following, a subset of the compound set S is defined. This definition is required for stating the results in Section III.
Definition 5: Let for the compound source S = {XY Z, s} s∈S ,Ŝ be the set of all possible states of marginal RV X. For a given marginal stateŝ ∈Ŝ, corresponding to the RV Xŝ , the set of all possible source states is given by
III. SK CAPACITY RESULTS
In this section, SK capacity results of compound DMMS models are presented. Moreover, short proof sketches are provided for the first and third theorems. The complete formal proofs are given in Section IV. For all theorems which are stated in this section, the setsŜ and I(ŝ) are given by Definition 5.
In the following, Theorem 1 gives a single-letter lowerbound for the capacity of a compound DMMS source model with a finite set of source states where the public communication rate is limited.
Theorem 1: For a finite compound DMMS model with a source S = {XY Z, s} s∈S and a one-way communication over a public noiseless channel with constraint ∈ (0, ∞], it holds:
where the outer max is taken over all RVs Uŝ and Vŝ such that it holds:
Proof sketch: To achieve the SK rate in (6), Alice estimates her marginal stateŝ ∈Ŝ by hypothesis testing such that the estimation error is exponentially small [27] . Similarly as in [17] , she sends this along with other information related to her observation over the public channel to Bob. In Figure 1 , this is denoted by f c (X n s ). Given an estimated marginal source state of Aliceŝ ∈Ŝ , the joint source state s is not necessarily known to the terminals. However, by Definition 5, it is known that s ∈ I(ŝ).
For the correctly estimated Alice's state, sayŝ ∈Ŝ, Lemma 7 from Subsection IV-A, assures that Alice and Bob can generate some CR by using their knowledge with an exponentially small error. This CR is universal for all source states s ∈ I(ŝ).
Furthermore, the public communication rate should be lower than a given > 0. Therefore, the coding scheme, introduced in Lemma 7, should work with respect to this limitation which is given by (7) . This problem for the case where no communication constraint is given is easier to solve and a non-compound version is available in [12, Problem 17.15b ].
Finally, as seen in Figure 1 , Alice and Bob generate their SKs K A and K B based on the CR by using a SK generator. However, f c (X n s ) is also received by Eve. Lemma 8, again from Subsection IV-A, assures the existence of a SK generator which guarantees the strong secrecy and the uniformity of the SK K A , for all possible s ∈ I(ŝ).
As a second result, a multi-letter SK capacity formula is computed for the case, in which no communication rate constraint is given and the set of source states is again finite.
Theorem 2: For a finite compound DMMS model with a source S = {XY Z, s} s∈S and a one-way communication over a public noiseless channel, it holds:
Finally as the main result, a single-letter SK capacity formula is given in the following for a degraded compound source with an arbitrary set of source states S which might be infinite.
Theorem 3: Consider a compound DMMS model with a source S = {XY Z, s} s∈S with an arbitrary set S, a finite set of marginal statesŜ, and a one-way communication over a public noiseless channel. If the following Markov chains are satisfied,
then it holds:
Proof sketch: In the first step, the achievability result from Theorem 1 is used to show that the SK rate in (11) is achievable for a finite set of source states S.
Next, for the infinite source S = {XY Z, s} s∈S , fix the marginal PD P Xŝ and define the infinite family of stochastic matrices {P Y Z,s|Xŝ : X → P(Y × Z)} s∈I(ŝ) . By using Lemma 5 from Subsection IV-A, it follows that there exists a finite family of stochastic matrices {W s :
, which approximates the infinite family. The finite set I (ŝ) contains all indices of this finite family for the givenŝ.
Define the finite source S :
It is shown that the SK generation protocol, which is used for the finite source S , also guarantees the achievability of the given rate in (11) for the infinite source S.
Remark: The orders of Markov chains in Theorem 3 are crucial in determining the SK capacity. For example, assume that the orders of (10) are changed to Xŝ − Z t − Y r . In this case the capacity is C sk (S) = 0. This is because, by using [9, Th. 1], it holds that
IV. PROOFS
This section is divided into 3 parts. Subsection IV-A gives a short review of definitions and results which are required in the proofs. In Subsection IV-B, Lemmas 7 and 8 for random coding and security are presented. Finally, Subsection IV-C presents the formal proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
A. Preliminaries
For the typical sequences and their related sets the same definitions as in [12, Ch. 2 and 17] are taken. Let N(x|x n ) give the number of repetitions of an element x in the sequence x n and N(x, y|x n , y n ) the number of repetitions of the pair (x, y) in the pair sequence (x n , y n ). For two RVs X and Y and stochastic matrix P Y |X : X → P(Y), the following definitions are used when > 0:
In the following, a series of lemmas and propositions is provided which will be used in the proofs. Lemma 6 is an alternative to Alicki-Fannes inequality in quantum regime [28] .
Lemma 1 [12] : Let U, X, and Y be RVs taking value in U, X , and Y respectively. Assume 0 < ξ < ζ < σ, and τ > 0 are all in R and n ∈ N. Then, it holds that [12] : Let RVs U and X take their values in U and X respectively. Consider N = exp(n R) sequences u n l with l ∈ L := {1, 2 · · · N}, which are independently drawn by a PD P n U with I (U ; X) < R. Then for all τ ∈ (0, R − I (U ; X)), all ζ > 0 sufficiently small, all n ∈ N sufficiently large, and all
with a probability approaching one, doubly exponentially fast. Lemma 3 [12] : Let RVs U, V, and X take their values in U, V, and X respectively. Consider N = exp(n R) sequences v n l with l ∈ L := {1, 2 · · · N}, which are independently drawn by a PD P n V |U (.|u n ) for a given u n with I (V ; X|U ) < R.
Then for all τ ∈ (0, R − I (V ; X|U )), all σ > 0 sufficiently small, all n ∈ N sufficiently large, and all x n such that
with a probability approaching one, doubly exponentially fast. This holds uniformly for all given u n ∈ U n . Lemma 4 [12] , [29] : Let , η > 0 and λ > 0 all in R and k ∈ N be given and U be a RV taking value in U.
where P 0 (i ) = 1/k for all i = 1, 2, · · · k. Random selection means that the κ(u), u ∈ U are chosen independently and identically distributed (iid) uniformly. Lemma 5 [30] : Let S be an arbitrary set and possibly infinite and {W s : X → P(U)} s∈S be a family of stochastic matrices. For every l ∈ N with l ≥ 2|U| 2 , there exists a family of stochastic matrices {W s :
Lemma 6 [31] : Let (X, Y ) and (X , Y ) be two pairs of RVs taking values in X × Y with PDs P XY and P X Y respectively. Furthermore, let γ := 1 2 P XY − P X Y and γ ≤ 1 − 1 |X ×Y| . Then, it holds that
B. Random Coding and Security Lemmas
In this subsection, Lemmas 7 and 8 for finite compound sets with their proofs are presented. Similar techniques which are used in the non-compound versions in [10] , [12, Lemmas 17.5 and 17.22] , and [32] , are used in the following proofs and extended to the compound setup. For completeness, we present all proofs in detail. These lemmas are required for the proof of Theorem 1. Assume in Lemma 7, if the values in the equations (12), (13), (14) , and (15) are not integer numbers, then the smallest integer which is larger than the given expression is taken. Assume Nŝ ,1 Nŝ ,2 random sequences u n i j (ŝ) ∈ U n , chosen independently according to PD P n Uŝ , are given and known to Alice and Bob where i ∈ I : = 1, 2, · · · , Nŝ ,1 , j ∈ J := 1, 2, · · · , Nŝ ,2 ,
Moreover, let for each u n i j (ŝ), Nŝ ,3 Nŝ ,4 random sequences v i j pq n (ŝ) ∈ V n , chosen conditionally independently according to P n Vŝ |Uŝ (·|u n i j (ŝ)), be given and known to Alice and Bob where p ∈ P : = 1, 2, · · · , Nŝ ,3 , q ∈ Q := 1, 2, · · · , Nŝ ,4 ,
Nŝ ,4 : = exp n min
Then CR can be generated between Alice and Bob in two ways: a) For n ∈ N sufficiently large, there exist encoder functions f : T → I and g : T → J , with a probability approaching 1, doubly exponentially fast where
Alice encodes her observation x n ∈ T by these functions to the sequence u n i j (ŝ) where j is the CR. For functions f and g, extending their domain to X n by defining for all
for some δ 0 > 0. Thus, Bob can reconstruct g(x n ) = j from ( f (x n ),ŝ, y n ) for given realizations X n s = x n and Y n s = y n . b) For each f and g from part a), and n ∈ N sufficiently large, there exist encoder functions ϕ : T → P and ρ : T → Q with a probability approaching 1, doubly
Alice encodes her observation x n ∈ T by these functions to the sequence v i j pq n (ŝ) where q is the CR.
For functions ϕ and ρ, extending their domain to X n by defining for all x n ∈ T , ϕ(x n ) = ρ(x n ) = 0, there exists a decoderρ : I × J × P ×Ŝ × Y n → Q such that for all s ∈ I(ŝ),
for some δ 0 > 0. Thus, Bob can reconstruct ρ(x n ) = q from ( f (x n ), g(x n ), ϕ(x n ),ŝ, y n ) for given realizations X n s = x n and Y n s = y n . Proof: a) Let R be the rate of choosing the sequences {u n i j (ŝ)} (i, j )∈I×J which implies that Nŝ ,1 Nŝ ,2 = exp(n R). Therefore, by (12) and (13) 
Similarly as in [12, Lemma 17.22] , for all x n ∈ T , it holds by the definition in (16) 
all ζ > 0 sufficiently small, all n ∈ N sufficiently large, and all x n ∈ T that 1 n
with a probability approaching one, doubly exponentially fast. Therefore, for each x n ∈ T , the number of chosen sequences u n i j (ŝ) which are in T n [U X,ŝ]ζ (x n ) is non-zero and the functions f and g as mentioned in the lemma, do exist with this probability.
Define for all i ∈ I and y n ∈ Y n , the decoder as follows:
Moreover, define
In the following, it is shown that Alice and Bob's observation (x n , y n ) ∈ X n × Y n is in the set T 0 with a probability exponentially close to one. It holds that
Lemma 1.1 implies for every x n ∈ T n [Xŝ ]ξ with ξ ∈ (0, ζ ) that T n [U X,ŝ]ζ (x n ) = ∅ for n large enough. Thus by the definition in (16) , it follows that T ⊃ T n [Xŝ ]ξ and thus Lemma 1.2 implies for some c 0 > 0 that
On the other hand, for every x n ∈ T with f (x n ) = i and g(x n ) = j , it holds that (u n i j (ŝ), x n ) ∈ T n [U X,ŝ]ζ . Since for all s ∈ I(ŝ), the Markov chains Uŝ − Xŝ − Y s hold, Lemma 1.6 implies for c 0 sufficiently small that
. This inequality together with (21) and (22) gives
for some c 1 > 0 and n sufficiently large. Therefore, to compute the upper-bound of the probability in (17), we may just concentrate on all (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 with
A necessary condition for (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 is given by
which together with (24) and (20) implies that
Furthermore, it follows for all (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 that x n ∈ T and thus for f (x n ) = i and g(x n ) = j = m, it holds that
Define the RṼ Uŝ := {U n i j,ŝ } (i, j )∈I×J = (U n 11,ŝ , U n 12,ŝ , · · · , U n |I||J |,ŝ ) and letũ(ŝ) := {u n i j (ŝ)} (i, j )∈I×J be an arbitrary realization. For all s ∈ I(ŝ) and (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 , the relations (25) and (26) give the following upper-bound for the error probability in (17) 
The upper-bound of e s (ũ(ŝ)) is given by taking its expectation with respect toŨŝ as follows EŨˆs e s (Ũŝ )
where the equality follows by RVs {U n i j,ŝ } (i, j )∈I×J being independent and using the Fubini theorem [33, Ch. II, Sec. 6]. In the following, an upper-bound for the inner summation in (27) is derived, which automatically gives the upper-bound for the expectation on the left hand side.
Let i ∈ I, j ∈ J , m ∈ J − { j } and τ, τ > 0 be given such that δ > τ + τ . It holds for all (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 , all ζ, σ > 0 sufficiently small, and n sufficiently large that
where the equality follows again by RVs {U n i j,ŝ } (i, j )∈I×J being independent. The inequality is a result of Lemma 1.7. Moreover, the definitions in (12) and (13) imply that
By using (28) and (29) , it follows that the inner summation in (27) is upper-bounded by I(ŝ) exp −n(δ−τ −τ ) , which implies that
Let δ 1 be sufficiently small such that 0 < δ 1 < δ − τ − τ . By the Markov inequality, it follows that Pr e s (Ũŝ ) ≥ exp(−nδ 1 ) ≤ EŨˆs e s (Ũŝ )
Therefore, (30) and (31) imply for all ζ and σ sufficiently small, and all n large enough that Pr s∈I(ŝ) e s (Ũŝ )< exp(−nδ 1 )
Thus, there exists a realizationũ(ŝ) = {u n i j (ŝ)} (i, j )∈I×J of the RVŨŝ, where for all s ∈ I(ŝ) and (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 , the upper-bound of the error probability in (17) is given by exp(−nδ 1 ). This implies by using (23) that the total error probability in (17) is exponentially small with some δ 0 > 0.
b) The proof of the second part is very similar to the first part. For a given (i, j ) ∈ I × J , the number of chosen random sequences v i j pq n is Nŝ ,3 Nŝ ,4 = exp(n R ), where R is the rate of choosing the random sequences. Similar to (19) , conditions (14) and (15) 
Therefore, Lemma 3 implies that functions ϕ and ρ as mentioned in the lemma do exist.
According to part a) of this lemma, Bob is able to reconstruct g(x n ) = j , by knowing f (x n ),ŝ and y n . Therefore, he knows also u n i j (ŝ). Let ϑ ∈ R be given such that ϑ > σ. Similar to (20) , the decoder is defined asρ(i, j, p,ŝ, y n )
and otherwise zero. Define the set T 0 as follows. Similar to (23), the probability P n XY,s (T 0 c ) is exponentially small. 
Similarly as in part a), it can be shown that the error probability in (18) is upper-bounded for all (x n , y n ) ∈ T 0 by i∈I, j ∈J (x n ,y n )∈T 0 f (x n )=i, g(x n )= j P n XY,s (x n , y n ) e s ṽ i j (ŝ) .
For τ, τ > 0 with τ + τ < δ, Lemma 1.8 implies that
Moreover, by using (14) and (15) 
Thus, (35) and (36) imply by using the definition in (33) that
Therefore, it follows for all 0 < δ 1 < δ − τ − τ that Pr s∈I(ŝ) e s (Ṽ i j,ŝ ) < exp(−nδ 1 ) U n i j,ŝ = u n i j (ŝ)
This implies that there exist sequencesṽ i j (ŝ), for which the error upper-bound in (34) is exponentially small. Lemma 8: Let Alice's stateŝ ∈Ŝ be given and C, D s , andŜŝ with s ∈ I(ŝ) be RVs taking value in C, D, andŜ respectively. RVs C and D s denote the CR and part of Eve's Knowledge respectively. Assume α ∈ (0, 1 6 ] and η ∈ (0, 1 3 ] with α ≤ η are given and for all s ∈ I(ŝ), there exist sets Then, there exists a SK generator κ : C → {1, 2, · · · , k} which maps the CR to a SK κ(C) such that for all s ∈ I(ŝ),
with a probability at least 1 − 2k |I(ŝ)| |D| e − Proof: Let s ∈ I(ŝ) be given. Define:
Similarly as in [12, Lemma 17.5] , we show in the first step that the following inequality is true:
This inequality is required later to show that (40) holds. For this, let (c, d) ∈ B s be given and s ∈ I(ŝ). It follows that
where the first inequality follows by (37) , (42), and (43) and the last one by (41). This implies by the definition in (44) that
Moreover, by (42) and (43) it holds for all s ∈ I(ŝ) that 
The relations (49) and (50) together with the assumption (38) of the lemma imply that
By (48) and (51), it follows that P C D,s|Ŝŝ (G s |ŝ) ≥ 1 − η 2 . This implies by the definition in (45) for all s ∈ I(ŝ) that
where the second inequality follows by (46). The desired relation (47) follows by simplifying this inequality.
In the second step, we show that a SK generator κ, satisfying (40), exists. For this, consider each member of the family of PDs P C|DŜ,s (.|d,ŝ) with d ∈ E s and s ∈ I(ŝ). Lemma 4 implies for a randomly selected SK generator κ that Pr κ(P C|DŜ,s (.|d,ŝ) 
where P 0 (i ) = 1/k for all i = 1, 2 · · · k. The universal upperbound in (52) was calculated by taking = 2α in Lemma 4 and by the inequalities α ≤ 1/6 and η ≤ 1/3 from the assumption of the lemma. Therefore, for the following events
it follows by (41) and (52) that
where the min in (53) is taken over all s ∈ I(ŝ) and d ∈ D s . This means that a SK generator κ satisfies the relation κ(P C|DŜ,s (.|d,ŝ)) − P 0 ≤ 2(α + η) simultaneously for all d ∈ E s and s ∈ I(ŝ) with the probability stated in (53). Therefore, it holds by the same probability that
which gives the desired relation in (40). The equality is the result of Definition 3 and the first inequality follows from the uniform continuity of entropy [12, Problem 3.10] , [31] . The last step is a result of the inequality (47). Moreover, by combining the two assumptions in (39), it implies that k ln 2k|D| · |I(ŝ)| < α 5 · min
and consequently, the probability in (53) is non-zero.
C. Proof of Main Results
In the following, the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3 are presented. For the proof of the first two theorems, similar techniques which are used for deriving the non-compound SK capacity results in [10] and [12, Th. 17.21] , are used and extended to the finite compound setup. For completeness, all proofs are presented in detail. The proof of Theorem 3 is based on an approximation technique and uses Lemmas 5 and 6.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let δ > 0, and 0 < ξ < ζ < σ, all in R be given. Consider Nŝ ,1 Nŝ ,2 sequences u n i j (ŝ) ∈ U n as given in Table I , which are chosen independently by PD P n Uŝ with i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . , Nŝ ,1 }, j ∈ J := {1, 2, . . . , Nŝ ,2 }, and Nŝ ,1 and Nŝ ,2 satisfying (12) and (13) from Lemma 7. Moreover, for every u n i j (ŝ) from Table I , consider Nŝ ,3 Nŝ ,4 sequences v i j pq n (ŝ) ∈ V n , which are chosen conditionally independently by PD P n Vŝ |Uŝ (.|u n i j (ŝ)) with p ∈ P := {1, 2, · · · , Nŝ ,3 }, q ∈ Q := {1, 2, · · · , Nŝ ,4 }, (14) and (15) from Lemma 7. Assume that the random sequences u n i j (ŝ) in Table I and their corresponding sequences {v i j pq n (ŝ)} ( p,q)∈P×Q are known to Alice and Bob.
To show the achievability of (6), the proof is divided into two parts. In part a), the following rate is shown to be achievable: This gives a special case of (6) and (7) . In part b), the achievability of the SK rate in (6) is shown, when it is positive. Part a) Assume R sk from (54) is positive i.e. min s∈I(ŝ)
As explained in Section III, Alice estimates her marginal statistic by hypothesis testing. Assume thatŝ ∈Ŝ is the index corresponding to the correct decision and all others ∈Ŝ − {ŝ} correspond to a wrong decision. For any observation X n s , let the resulting estimated state be denoted by the RVŜŝ , taking value in the setŜ and having the PD PŜˆs . It holds by [27] and [12, Problem 2.13b] for some c 0 , c 1 > 0 that
∀s ∈Ŝ − {ŝ}, PŜˆs (s) ≤ exp(−nc 1 ).
Next, Alice sends her estimated marginal source state to Bob over the public noiseless channel. Assume that the hypothesis testing has led to the correct decisionŝ. Alice and Bob find the corresponding family of sequences {u n i j (ŝ)} (i, j )∈I×J from Table I by knowingŝ. Lemma 7a implies the existence of the encoder functions f : X n → I ∪ {0} and g : X n → J ∪ {0}. These encoders give the indices f (x n ) = i and g(x n ) = j of the sequence u n i j (ŝ) to be chosen from the family of sequences {u n i j (ŝ)} (i, j )∈I×J . As shown in Figure 2 , in addition to the transmittedŝ, Alice sends further the index f (x n ) = i to Bob over the public channel. Lemma 7a implies the existence of a decoderg : I ×Ŝ × Y n → J , with which, Bob can reconstruct the index g(x n ) = j . This j is the CR between Alice and Bob.
In total, for all Alice's estimation results which may lead to a correct or incorrect decision, the error probability upper-bound for all s ∈ I(ŝ) is given by
where the inequality is a result of (17) for some δ 0 > 0 and (58). Thus, condition (3) of Definition 4 is satisfied.
The whole message which is sent over the public channel is represented by the RV f c (X n s ) = ( f (X n s ),Ŝŝ ) having the range size f · |Ŝ|. As shown in the following, the communication rate satisfies condition (1) of Definition 4:
where the last equality follows by (12) and the inequality is a result of (55) and is valid for all n sufficiently large. After the index g(x n ) = j is reconstructed by Bob, both Alice and Bob may generate their SK, based on this CR. Thus, it remains to show that there exists a SK generator κ : J → {1, 2 · · · , k}, giving rise to the RV K A = κ(g(X n s )), which satisfies condition (4) of Definition 4.
Again the condition is verified for both estimation results. Assume hypothesis testing has led to the correct decision and s is sent to Bob over the public channel. Define for s ∈ I(ŝ)
where T is given in (16) . A similar discussion as for (23) from Lemma 7, implies for some c 2 > 0 and n large enough that
Similarly as in [12, Th. 17.21] for the non-compound version, define for all s ∈ I(ŝ), the RVs C and D s and the set B s to be used in Lemma 8, as follows C : = g(X n s ), D s := f (X n s ), Z n s , 1 T s (X n s , Z n s ) ,
Assume that RVs C and D s take their values in the sets C and D respectively. Moreover, the sets D s and B s,d are defined as in Lemma 8. In the following, it will be shown that all conditions of Lemma 8 are satisfied. It holds that
for some c 3 > 0 and n sufficiently large. The last two inequalities follow by (57), (60) and Lemma 1.2. Furthermore, define the parameters α and η for some arbitrary τ > 0 as follows α := exp(−n(δ + 5τ )), η := exp(−nδ).
(63)
For δ and τ sufficiently small and n large enough, it holds that η 2 − α 2 > exp(−nc 3 ). Therefore, it follows by (62) that
This guarantees condition (38) of Lemma 8. Moreover, the conditions α ∈ (0, 1/6] and η ∈ (0, 1/3] are also satisfied.
To check condition (37) of Lemma 8, we find first an upper-bound of |B s |. The non-emptiness constraint T n [U X Z,s]σ (u n i j (ŝ), z n ) = ∅ from the definition of the set B s is a sufficient condition for u n i j (ŝ) ∈ T n [U Z,s]σ |X | (z n ) and thus
Furthermore, for R being the rate of choosing the random sequences {u n i j (ŝ)} (i, j )∈I×J , it holds by (12) and (13) that
where the last inequality is the result of the assumption (56). Moreover, for all ( j, (i, z n , 1)) ∈ B s it holds that z n ∈ T n [Z s ]ξ which implies by using Lemma 1.1 for n large enough that T n [U Z,s]ζ (z n ) = ∅. Therefore, it follows by (64) and Lemma 2 for ξ and ζ sufficiently small and n large enough that
where the last inequality follows by (19) and Lemma 1.4.
In the second step of verifying condition (37), we find an upper-bound for P C D,s|Ŝŝ j, (i, z n , 1)|ŝ . For all ( j, (i, z n , 1)) ∈ B s , it holds by using (57) and (61) that 1 − exp(−nc 0 ) · P C D,s|Ŝŝ j, (i, z n , 1)|ŝ
where the third inequality follows by Lemma 1.3 and the last one by Lemma 1.5 for σ sufficiently small and n large enough. Moreover, by using Markov chains in (55), it holds that
The relations (65), (66), and (67) together with the definition of α in (63) imply for n large enough that
Thus, condition (37) of Lemma 8 is also satisfied. Therefore, Lemma 8 implies that there exists a SK generator κ : J → {1, 2, · · · , k} with k satisfying (39), such that the relation (40) holds. By the definitions in (63), both α and η approach zero exponentially fast. Moreover, by (39) and (65), it follows that k does not increase faster than exponentially. Thus, the inequality (40) implies for K A = κ(g(X n s )) that
for some c 4 , c 5 > 0. Consequently, the security index is exponentially small for the case of correct estimation decision. In total, for all estimation results which may lead to a correct or incorrect decision, the security index is upper-bounded as shown in the following
for some c 6 > 0. The last inequality is a result of (58) and (68) and the fact that k does not increase faster than exponentially. Therefore, condition (4) of Definition 4 is satisfied.
In the rest of this part, we show that R sk satisfies condition (2) of Definition 4. By using the definition of α from (63) and the set D being the alphabet of RV D s , it follows that the expression e 1/α (2|D| |I(ŝ)|) −1 from (39) increases doubly exponentially fast. For any d := (i, z n , 1) ∈ D s and B s,d from Lemma 8, it follows by (65) that |B s,d | does not increase faster than exponentially. Therefore, for n large enough, it holds that
Thus, to guarantee condition (39) of Lemma 8 it is necessary that k be lower than the left hand side of (69). For this, a lowerbound for min s∈I(ŝ),d∈D s |B s,d | should be first determined.
Therefore for all s ∈ I(ŝ) and d = (i, z n , 1) ∈ D s , it holds that
Furthermore by using (13), the rate of choosing the random sequences u n i j (ŝ) for a fixed index i , is given by
Thus, for δ sufficiently small, assumption (56) gives 
Therefore, by keeping k lower than the left hand side of (69), it follows by (63) 
Because otherwise, it follows by Markov chains in (7) that As shown in Figure 3 , in addition to the transmittedŝ, Alice sends further the indices f (x n ) = i and ϕ(x n ) = p to Bob over the public channel. By part a) of this theorem, g(x n ) = j is known to Bob. Lemma 7b implies the existence of a decoder ρ : I ×J ×P ×Ŝ ×Y n → Q, with which Bob can reconstruct the index q to be used as the CR. The upper-bound of the error probability was given in (18) from Lemma 7. Due to (73), the index g(x n ) = j can not be used as the CR any more.
Similarly as in (59) in part a), for all estimation results which may lead to a correct or incorrect decision, the error probability upper-bound for all s ∈ I(ŝ) is exponentially small. Therefore, condition (3) of Definition 4 is satisfied.
The public communication function is represented by the RV f c (X n s ) = ( f (X n s ), ϕ(X n s ),Ŝŝ ). As shown in the following, the communication rate satisfies condition (1) of for n sufficiently large. The equality is a result of (12) and (14) from Lemma 7 and the inequality follows by (7) .
For showing that conditions (2) and (4) of Definition 4 also hold, the RVs C, D s , and the set B s can be defined similarly as in part a), but this time for the coding scheme from Lemma 7b). It can be shown that conditions (37) and (38) of Lemma 8 are again satisfied and thus there exists a SK generator κ : Q → {1, 2 · · · , k}, giving rise to the RV K = κ(ρ(X n s )), which satisfies conditions (2) and (4) is achievable for any n ∈ N, where the outer max is taken over all RVs Uŝ and Vŝ satisfying (9).
To show the achievability of (8), we have to show that the limit in (8) exists. Similarly as in [21] , the proof follows by using the Fekete's lemma [34] which states that if a sequence a n is superadditive i.e. a n+m ≥ a n +a m , then lim n→∞ a n /n exists. Define the sequences a n (ŝ) : = max Uŝ ,Vŝ min s∈I(ŝ) I (Vŝ ; Y n s |Uŝ) − max s∈I(ŝ) I (Vŝ ; Z n s |Uŝ) , a n : = min s∈Ŝ a n (ŝ).
Take two arbitrary independent Markov chains Uŝ ,1 − Vŝ ,1 − X n s,1 − Y n s,1 Z n s,1 ,
such that m, n ∈ N and it holds: = a n (ŝ) + a m (ŝ).
Thus, by taking the minimum from both sides of this inequality and using the definition in (74), it follows that a n+m ≥ min s∈Ŝ a n (ŝ) + a m (ŝ) ≥ min s∈Ŝ {a n (ŝ)} + min s∈Ŝ {a m (ŝ)} = a n + a m . using (89) that I (κ(g(X n s )); Z n s , f (X n s )|Ŝŝ =ŝ) − I (κ(g(X n s )); Z n s , f (X n s )|Ŝŝ =ŝ) ≤ 3γ 3 log(|K × Z n × I| − 1) + 3h(γ 3 ) ≤ 3|Y × Z| 2 c 2 2n(1−exp(−nc 0 )) +3h |Y × Z| 2 2n 2 (1−exp(−nc 0 )) < 1 , (90) for some c 2 > 0 and n sufficiently large. The second inequality follows by the fact that the argument of the log function does not increase faster than exponentially. Therefore, it follows by using (88) The existence of the SK generator κ for the finite source S follows by applying the relation |I (ŝ)| < (n 3 + 1) |X ×Y×Z| to (39) and (69), so that the probability in (53) is non-zero.
For the converse proof, assume that R sk is achievable. The result from [9, Th. 1] implies that R sk ≤ min s∈Ŝ inf r,t ∈I(ŝ)
Furthermore, for any givenŝ ∈Ŝ and all r, t ∈ I(ŝ), it holds by (10) that I (Xŝ ; Y r ) − I (Xŝ ; Z t ) = I (Xŝ ; Y r |Z t ).
This identity together with (91) completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
The SK generation protocol which is introduced in this work uses a two phase approach to achieve the given SK rate. In the first step, Alice estimates her state and sends this along with other information which is obtained from her observation to Bob. Although, this information is also received by Eve, it is shown that the strong secrecy and uniformity of the generated SK is still guaranteed. In the second step, Bob uses this information including the estimated state of Alice to generate the SK. A single-letter lower-bound for the SK capacity of a finite compound source is derived as a function of the communication rate parameter between Alice and Bob. This result is further extended to a multi-letter SK capacity formula by discarding the public communication rate constraint. As the final result, a single-letter SK capacity formula is derived for degraded compound sources with no communication constraint and an arbitrary (possibly infinite) set of source states. It is shown that for any infinite compound source, with finite marginal set of states, there exists an approximating finite source whose SK generation protocol also guarantees the achievability of the given rates for the infinite source.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK After submission of the present paper, the second author of this work collaborated in another project considering the problem in compound quantum regime [37] , where no communication rate parameter is taken into account. In that work an extra condition called regularity is put on the compound quantum source to make it continuous with respect to the marginal source. For this class of regular quantum sources, the multiletter SK capacity without communication rate parameter is completely characterized, where the class of marginal sources is also arbitrary. As future work, this extra regularity condition can be applied to infinite compound sources (classical or quantum) to characterize the multi-letter SK capacity, where the communication rate parameter is also taken into account. In this case, the class of marginal sources would be also arbitrary and possibly infinite. This problem is still open and will be the subject of future research.
